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Abstract 
This paper, based on a presentation at the 7
th
 conference on Conceptions of Library and 
Information Science, considers the nature of information science as a discipline and 
profession. It is argued that information science may be understood as a field of study, with 
human recorded information as its concern, focusing on the components of the information 
chain, studied through the perspective of domain analysis, in specific or general contexts. A 
particular aspect of interest is those aspects of information organisation, and of human 
information-related behaviour, which are invariant to changes in technology.  Information 
science can also be seen as a science of evaluation of information, understood as semantic 
content with respect to qualitative growth of knowledge, and change in knowledge structures 
in domains. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction; the debatable nature of information science 
 
Debates about the nature of information science, the scope of the discipline, and its relations 
to other academic and professional areas, are as old as the discipline itself. These are not 
merely navel-gazing, or arguments about terminology. They relate to the validity and viability 
of the discipline, and have significance for the extent to which its unique contributions are 
recognised.  
 
Information science first became known as a discipline during the 1950s. The first usage of 
the term in a paper by Jason Farradane (1955), in which he stated that contemporary British 
academic and professional qualifications were “.. a pattern for establishing qualifications in 
documentation, or ‘information science’ “, following from earlier uses by Farradane of the term 
‘information scientist’, to mean initially a specialist in the handling of scientific and technical 
information (Shapiro 1995, Robinson 2009). The discipline grew out of the longer-standing 
'documentation' movement, under numerous social, economic and technical influences; see 
Robinson (2009) for a summary of the literature describing these origins. 
 
It is clear that, from the origins of the terms, there has been little agreement about the nature 
of information science, and indeed information scientists (Shapiro 1995, Bawden 2008, 
Robinson 2009). Was the concern with the ‘information of science’, i.e. the practicalities of the 
handling of scientific and technical information, or with the ‘science of information’, i.e. the 
academic study of information phenomena? This question has never really been settled; in 
essence, it is the question of whether information science is a discipline, or a practical art. 
 
Heilprin wrote in 1989 that "although many laws, hypotheses, and speculations about 
information have been proposed, adequate scientific and epistemic foundations for a general 
science of information have not yet appeared".  Nearly twenty years later Zins (2007) 
concluded that "Apparently, there is not a uniform conception of information science. The field 
seems to follow different approaches and traditions: for example, objective approaches 
versus cognitive approaches, and the library tradition versus the documentation tradition 
versus the computation tradition. The concept has different meanings, which imply different 
knowledge domains. Different knowledge domains imply different fields. Nevertheless, all of 
them are represented by the same name, information science. No wonder that scholars, 
practitioners and students are confused." 
 
There has, of course, been much debate about what kind of discipline information science is; 
for overviews of the issues see Hawkins (2001), Webber (2003) and Robinson (2009). It has 
variously been claimed as a social science, a meta-science, an inter-science, a post-modern 
science, an interface science, a superior science, a rhetorical science, a nomad science, a 
liberal art, a knowledge science, and a multidisciplinary field of study (Robinson 2009).  
 
A further unsolved issue is the relationship between information and other academic and 
professional disciplines.  One area of debate has been the relation with 'adjacent' disciplines 
such as librarianship, archiving, information systems and computer science; views here have 
ranged from such disciplines being the same thing, entirely distinct, distinct but inter-
dependent, distinct but naturally linked, and part of a composite discipline. This debate also 
manifests in the question of whether there is any meaningful link between the concept of 
information in different domains; those who see the possibility of such a link include Bates 
(2006) and Bawden (2007), while those who reject it include Hjørland (2007).  
 
We must therefore conclude that there is still no agreement about some of the basic aspects 
of the information science discipline.  This matters since this lack of agreement as to what the 
discipline is about leads inevitable to a difficulty in explaining what its value and benefits may 
be. As Dillon (2007) reminds us, although the questions central to library / information science 
are of great interest to society, the answers are not usually sought from the LIS community. 
 
One approach to overcome this problem is to attempt an understanding of information 
science in terms of two well-established concepts within the field: the communication chain 
and domain analysis. 
 
   
 
Domain analysis and communication chain 
 
This approach, by which the discipline of information science is located in the examination of 
the information chain through the methods of domain analysis, was put forward by Robinson 
(2009). 
 
Many accounts and explanations of information science from the 1960s onwards have 
focused on the idea of the ‘information chain’ or ‘information life cycle’; the sequence of 
processes by which recorded information, in the form of documents, is communicated from 
author to user (Robinson 2009, Webber 2003, Summers, Oppenheim, Meadows, and Kinnell 
1999). 'Documents' may be understood broadly, to include entities other than conventional 
written documents (Buckland 1997, Frohmann 2009, Turner and Allen 2010). As Meadows 
(1991) points out, there are a number of variations of this chain, according to the type of 
information and information-bearing entities involved; the nature of the chain has changed 
considerably over time, largely under the influence of new technologies (Duff 1997). But 
typically the chain has been described as having components such as: creation – 
dissemination – organisation – indexing – storage – use. Zins' (2007) recent Delphi study 
shows that, to a large extent, perceptions of information science still revolve around these 
concepts. 
 
The communication chain by itself may reasonably be seen as too restricted a focus for the 
discipline. Our viewpoint therefore complements it by a framework for studying it, and for 
improving its effectiveness in practice: domain analysis. 
 
Domain analysis, in the sense in which the term is used here, was introduced by Birger 
Hjørland,  who regards it as encapsulating the unique competences of the information 
specialist (Hjørland 2002, Hjørland and Albrechtsen 1995).   
 
Hjørland sees domain analysis, as practised by the information scientist, as comprising 
eleven distinct approaches, any of which may be used to help to understand the information 
of a domain. These approaches are: 
 
- production of literature guides and subject gateways 
  
- production of special classifications and thesauri 
 
- research on indexing and retrieval in specialist subjects 
 
- empirical user studies  
 
- bibliometric studies  
 
- historical studies 
  
- studies of documents and 'genres' 
  
- epistemological and critical studies 
  
- studies of terminology and special languages, discourse studies 
  
- studies of structures and organisations in the communication of information 
  
- studies in cognition, computing and artificial intelligence 
 
The domain analysis concept has been extended by several writers, building on Hjørland's 
ideas to extend and clarify the concept of 'domain', to introduce new aspects, as to extend the 
range of areas of applicability of the concept; see, for example, Tennis (2003), Hjørland and 
Hartel (2003), Feinberg (2007), Sundin (2003), Hartel (2003) and Karamuftuoglu (2006).  
 
This leads us to a simple conceptual model for the information science discipline: the six-
component information chain as the focus of interest, examined by the eleven approaches of 
domain analysis. Some of the approaches will ‘fit’ clearly with certain components – the 
production of special classifications with indexing, for example – but, in principle, any 
component/s of the chain may be studied by any approach/es. This leads to a to a three level 
model, able to describe any topics within information science (Robinson 2009). It involves 
defining a 'context' in terms of scale and media involved, thus: 
• Component (of chain) 
• Approach (of domain analysis) 
• Context (scale / media) 
 
A study of, for example, use of social network resources by historians might be described as: 
• component: use 
• approach: empirical user studies 
• context:  group (history discipline) / social networking 
 
This model also provides a way of showing the way in which related disciplines are linked: 
through the appropriate domain analysis approach, from one or more components of the 
chain in the appropriate context. 
 
Computer science, for example, is seen to be linked primarily through the ‘indexing and 
retrieving’ approach, via the overlap area of information retrieval, which may be argued to 
belong to both disciplines. Its artificial intelligence aspects (not always regarded as part of 
computer science proper) are linked through the ‘professional cognition and artificial 
intelligence’ approach. Robinson (2009) gives other examples, showing the advantage of this 
perspective in explaining the validity, and nature, of relations and overlaps between 
information science and other disciplines. 
 
This model gives a clear picture of the nature of information science, and a way of 
understanding its relations to other disciplines. However it does not explicitly identify those 
topics, which are entirely unique to information science. 
  
 
A unique academic territory? 
 
We may argue that the uniqueness of information science lies in the focus on the combination 
of the information chain and domain analysis. Though other disciplines and professions may 
be involved in components of the chain (publishers in dissemination, computer scientists in 
retrieval, etc.) and in aspects of domain analysis (philosophers in epistemology, historians in 
historical studies, and so on), only information science is interested in the totality of 
intersection of the totality of the two concepts, and in all the various uses of information (Kari 
2010). The information scientist therefore has a uniquely generalist approach to all aspects of 
the communication of information. 
  
We may find a more precisely stated 'uniqueness' in the ideas propounded over many years 
by Brian Vickery (see, for example, Vickery's last (2009) article, and an informal summary in 
Bawden (2010)). Regardless of advances in technology, Vickery insists there are some 
fundamentals of human information-related behaviour and of the organisation of information, 
which do not change.  This is not to say, of course, that information behaviour and information 
organisation do not change in new technological environments; rather that, at a deeper level, 
consistent explanatory factors may be found. It is the business of the information scientist to 
investigate these, and to show their relevance in whatever information environment they may 
be instantiated. It is the business of information science to investigate ‘technology invariant’ 
patterns of human information behaviour and issues of information organization, and to apply 
the findings to the design of systems and services. The area of unique interest to information 
science is therefore to be found within this part of the intersection of domain analysis and the 
communication chain. 
 
This gives us an understanding of information science as a very 'real' discipline, with its own 
academic and professional scope. But to find a further conceptual basis for the discipline, we 
need to consider the only quantitative theory of information, that of Shannon and Weaver, and 
extensions from it. We shall find, paradoxically, that this leads us to an appreciation of 
information as concerned with qualitative changes in knowledge. 
  
 
 
Quantitative Models of Information 
 
We will argue that Information Science (IS) is set apart from other disciplines by its unique 
object of study, namely, “the problem of evaluating information understood as semantic 
content with respect to qualitative development of knowledge in a given domain”1. While 
semantic conceptions of information developed in the wake of Shannon’s syntactic theory of 
information, and more generally computational approaches, study quantitative change, IS 
studies qualitative change, as every non-mechanical relevance judgment requires a 
qualitative leap. We will discuss each of the salient points in the above sentence, namely, 
“quantitative change”, “qualitative change”, “non-mechanical relevant judgement” and 
“qualitative leap” in detail below. However, before that we will review briefly Shannon’s 
syntactic and Barwise’s semantic theories of information. 
 
Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication (MTC) is concerned with the transmission 
of information from a source to a receiver over a physical communication channel (Shannon 
and Weaver, 1949). The average amount of information, H, associated with a source, S, from 
which symbols are selected to compose a message, is given by: 
H(S) = − Pr(S
i
i
N
∑ )log2 Pr(Si)
  (1) 
   
where, Pr(Si) is the probability of selection of a particular symbol, and N is the number of 
unique symbols in S. For instance, for a source that has 8 distinct symbols with equal 
probabilities of selection, N = 8 and Pr(Si) = 1/8. Information generated when a particular 
symbol is selected from a set of possible symbols is called self-information or surprisal, which 
measures the uncertainty associated with the selection of the symbol, and is given by: 
 
I(Si ) = - log2Pr(S)   (2) 
 
For N equiprobable symbols, equation (1) reduces to (2). For example, when N = 8, both H(S) 
and I(Si) are equal to 3 bits. 
 
MTC is a syntactic theory of information, as it is not concerned with the meaning of the 
symbols/messages transmitted but their quantity. In a system of two symbols (N=2), say head 
and tail of a coin, 1 bit of information is transmitted regardless of whether the head or tail of 
the coin symbolizes nuclear war or who is going to do the dishes. 
 
MTC is rightly criticised for not being relevant to IS, as IS’s main concern is the interpretation 
of documents, i.e., what documents are about or mean. Situation Theory (ST) developed by 
Barwise & Seligman (1997), Barwise & Perry (1983), Devlin (1991), and others attempt to 
provide a semantic theory of information, based loosely on the MTC paradigm.  
 
                                                
1
 We define information (after Floridi, 2005) in the context of this paper as “semantic content”, and 
more precisely, as “well-formed meaningful data”. Data, in turn, is defined as “lack of uniformity 
within some context”. Knowledge is sometimes defined in formal/mathematical approaches as 
“justified, true semantic information”. Although, this definition is useful in some contexts, it is not 
comprehensive enough. In a second sense, knowledge can be defined as “systematic understanding and 
integrated body of skills needed for performing successfully in a given domain”. The second sense has 
close ties to the concept of theory in science, and more useful for most IS purposes. 
ST provides an ontology (objects, situations, channels, etc.) and a set of logical principles 
(inference rules) that operate on the objects and situations2 via channels. Channels are 
informational-links that model the semantic, conventional, casual, etc. relationships between 
objects. Rijsbergen & Lalmas (1996, pp. 391-392) give an example of a channel that models 
the synonymy relationship in a thesaurus. For instance, in the context of information retrieval, 
if a document contains the term “belief”, it can be deduced, using a thesaurus as a channel, 
that it also contains (implicitly) the term “dogma”, assuming these two terms are related in the 
thesaurus used as a channel.  
  
Collectively, ontology and the set of inference rules determine the scope of deductions that 
can be made, and thus, the type of questions asked and answered about the state of affairs 
in a given situation. Changing the channel in ST amounts to changing the types of inferences 
made about entities/objects. The channel, thus, determines what can be known about a 
situation.  For instance, consider the use of WordNet3 as a channel. Information science is 
related to computer science through the meronym relation in WordNet, that is, computer 
science is a part of information science. However, according to WordNet, documentation is 
not related to IS. In fact, it is not even recorded as a discipline in WordNet. However, for 
instance, Hjørland & Capurro (2003) take a view that documentation is an important part of, if 
not synonymous with, information science. Other authors take different views on the same 
issue.  
 
This brief discussion illustrates that what a channel models in ST depends on the particular 
theoretical/epistemological position taken in constructing the ontology, which marks the limits 
of the usefulness of ST for IS. To put in other words, ST allows deductions once a model of 
the world is given in terms of objects and channels that represent the relationships between 
them. The main problem in ST is precisely the construction of the qualitative model of the 
world that provides the basis for drawing inferences. Once the model is given, quantitative 
inferences are relatively straightforward to compute. A more thorough discussion of ST and 
semantic information in the context of IS can be found in Karamuftuoglu (2009). 
 
 
 
Quantitative and Qualitative Change  
 
What is a qualitative change is a difficult question to answer rigorously. Intuitively, the term 
“qualitative” invokes the image of the creation of something new out of old where the steps 
involved in the transformation of the old into new are not obvious. The archetypal example is 
the transformation of larva into butterfly in the pupa or cocoon. This formulation is akin to the 
idea of “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” invoked in patent law in many countries.  
 
A similar idea is found in computation theory (see e.g., Boolos et al., 2007). Informally 
speaking, an effective method is a method in which each step in it may be described as an 
explicit, definite, mechanical instruction, that always leads, when rigorously followed, to the 
right answer in a finite number of steps, ignoring physical limitations on time, speed, and 
storage. The essential feature of an effective method, like that of the inventive step in patent 
law, is that it does not require any ingenuity from the person or machine executing it. An 
effectively computable function is similarly defined, as a function for which there is a finite 
procedure, an algorithm, instructing explicitly how to compute it.  
 
We, thus, define quantitative change as a process that leads from one state (old) to another 
(new) following an effective method. Inferences allowed in ST, and generally all deductive 
argumentation, are essentially effectively calculable. Deduction is a type of argumentation 
from general to particular. When the premises of a deductive argument are true, conclusions 
reached by it are guaranteed to be true. A complementary mode of reasoning found in 
                                                
2
 A situation could be seen as a collection of objects (entities) that corresponds to the limited parts of 
reality, for our purposes here. 
3
 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ 
traditional logic is induction. Induction is a method of reasoning from particular to general, 
which produces only probable conclusions that need to be verified by future observations. 
The forms of these two modes of reasoning are given below. 
 
 
Deduction 
Rule – All the beans from this bag are white. [given] 
Case – These beans are from this bag. [given] 
Result – These beans are white. [concluded] 
 
Induction 
Case – These beans are from this bag. [given] 
Result – These beans are white. [given] 
Rule – All the beans from this bag are white. [concluded] 
 
Symmetrically, we define qualitative change as a process where the transition from one state 
of the system to another, or one or more of the steps in the process, are not effectively 
calculable. Since, some of the steps in the process need to be “invented”, or require a “leap of 
faith”, so to speak, such processes are considered to be discontinuous, or involve qualitative 
jumps.  
 
Our thesis is that in IS there are certain processes that involve qualitative changes, and 
judgements that require qualitative decisions. Specifically, as we will show next, relevance 
judgements on documents, and more generally, subject analysis and classification, require 
qualitative decisions and jumps.  
 
Consider two alternative rules that specify the criteria of relevance of a document to a given 
query: 
 
Rule 1: Documents that support measures taken to prevent the spread of the HIV virus are 
relevant. 
Rule 2: Documents that support measures taken to prevent the spread of AIDS in terms of 
environmental and social factors are relevant. 
 
There are two possible deductions regarding the relevance of a given document X, 
corresponding to the two rules specified above: 
 
Deduction A: 
Rule – Documents that support measures taken to prevent the spread of the HIV virus are 
relevant 
Case – Document X does not support measures taken to prevent the spread of the HIV virus 
Result – Document X is non-relevant 
 
Deduction B: 
Rule – Documents that support measures taken to prevent the spread of AIDS in terms of 
social and environmental factors are relevant 
Case – Document X supports measures taken to prevent the spread of AIDS in terms of 
social/environmental factors 
Result – Document X is relevant 
 
As we have seen earlier, deductions are effectively calculable. Once, the rules are known, the 
relevance judgment is reduced to a mechanical inference. The question is, then, how one 
arrives at the rules of relevance. Arguably, the first rule is rather obvious to arrive at. 
Overwhelmingly, it is accepted that AIDS is caused by HIV. Therefore, a query such as “What 
is being done to help prevent the spread of AIDS in a certain country Y?” would invoke in 
most human judges or classifiers/analysts Rule A above, without the need for an inventive 
step or qualitative leap. The second rule, Rule B, arguably, is not so straightforward to 
conjecture, as the significance of social/environmental factors in AIDS is not universally 
recognised.  
 
The second inference would, therefore, require a process akin to creation of a hypothesis in 
science. C.S. Peirce, prominent philosopher and semiotician, calls the process of creation of 
a hypothesis from incomplete evidence as abduction. Abduction is different from both 
deduction and induction in that neither the rule nor the case is given. The rule is 
hypothesised, and based on this hypothesis a case is concluded. Abduction is a creative 
process of hypothesis forming, in which, based on the relevant evidence, the hypothesis that 
best explains a given phenomenon is formulated. In Peirce’s words: “Abduction is the process 
of forming explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new 
idea” (Peirce, 1958, v 5, para. 171-172).  This process is illustrated below. 
 
Abduction (Hypothesis) 
1. The surprising fact, F, is observed; 
2. But if H were true, F would be a matter of course. 
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true (Peirce, 1958, v 5, para.189). 
 
When the abductive mode of reasoning is applied to document evaluation, the process is 
more complex than the above case where the surprising observation corresponds to a fact. In 
the case of document evaluation/subject analysis, it is not known in advance whether there 
exists a user community for whom the document is actually relevant. This is postulated. 
Based on this postulate and the content analysis that reveals that the document contains 
information about environmental and social issues in Y, it is hypothesized that there exist 
alternative theories of AIDS causation, which explain the epidemic in terms of conventional 
social and environmental factors.  
 
In the aforementioned case of the relevance judgement on Document X, this takes the 
following form: 
 
Abduction (to arrive the alternative Deduction B):  
1. The surprising result, F (Document X is relevant to the topic “The spread of AIDS 
epidemic in Y”), is postulated. 
2. But if H (there exists an alternative theory of AIDS causation, which explains the 
AIDS epidemic in terms of social and environmental factors) were true, F would be 
a matter of course (given that the document reports relevant information on the 
economic and social development of Y) 
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true  
 
The conclusions reached by abduction, unlike deduction, are always uncertain. The assessor, 
thus, needs to research to find whether the hypothesis is true, i.e., there really exist 
social/environmental explanations of AIDS. Failing to find one would make the document non-
relevant. Conversely, discovery of a relevant theory would make the document relevant to a 
user group, who prioritizes such factors in explaining health problems over virus-based 
explanations.  
 
One final question remains to be answered: how does in practice an assessor make a 
qualitative jump from the postulation of the potential relevance of a document to the rule that 
specifies the relevance criterion? The assessor's knowledge of the major philosophies and 
schools of thought would be an advantage in formulating a hypothesis in reasoning processes 
similar to abduction. It is unreasonable to expect from even professional classifiers/assessors 
to have a detailed understanding of all significant issues and theories in a domain such as 
medicine. It is arguable that even subject experts do not necessarily know everything relevant 
to a particular information need in the domain of their expertise. However, basic philosophy 
knowledge (knowledge in the second sense mentioned earlier), especially, epistemology, and 
methodology, as well as history of science, would arguably make the process of qualitative 
jump easier in such IS tasks as document classification and subject analysis. 
 
We are now able to relate this idea back to the earlier material of this paper, by noting that the 
domain-analytic approach suggests that specific theories in a given field of study are built on 
more general metatheoretical frameworks (paradigms) or worldviews, which in turn are built 
on specific philosophical assumptions. Specific practices, tools and artefacts rest at the top of 
the pyramid, partially or wholly based on specific domain-dependent theories. Figure 1 
illustrates this idea.  
 
A metatheory, or as sometimes called a paradigm, is essentially a set of principles that 
prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory in a scientific discipline. In 
epidemiology, for instance, one can distinguish between the dominant biomedical paradigm, 
and alternative emerging or past paradigms. The dominant biomedical paradigm focuses on 
the biology of disease. The dominant paradigm in epidemiology has been criticised for 
ignoring the contextual factors, such as level of social and economic development of a given 
society. The alternative paradigms in epidemiology prioritise general socio-economic and 
environmental factors in combating diseases and improving public health (see Karamuftuoglu, 
2007, for a more detailed discussion of the above issues in the context of IS). 
 
Kuhn’s work on the history of science (Kuhn, 1962) shows that there is normally a single 
central paradigm, a single way of doing science, which he called “normal science”, in 
established fields such as physics and astronomy.  Before the establishment of a paradigm in 
a field of study, there is a period that Kuhn called “prescience”, which is characterised by the 
existence of two or more alternative frameworks that compete to become the dominant 
paradigm. Similarly, at the moments of crises in “normal science”, that is, when the central 
paradigm could no longer accommodate accumulating contradictory and conflicting results 
and observations, a number of alternative explanations of the anomalies compete. This is a 
period of “revolutionary science” according to Kuhn. When a new theory successfully resolves 
the anomalies, a “paradigm shift” happens, i.e., the old paradigm is replaced by the new. 
Science, thus, progresses discontinuously rather than in an orderly and continuous way. 
 
Hence, it is arguable from a Kuhnian perspective that relevance assessment and 
classification of documents should be carried out in terms of the objective movement of 
competing theories and metatheories/paradigms in a domain. In other words, qualitative 
judgement of documents requires an understanding of the qualitative growth of knowledge, 
and change in knowledge structures in domains. This is another defining feature of 
information science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Domain-analytic view of a field of study 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
As we have seen, there is no agreement on what the information science discipline is, or what 
its purpose and methods should be. The identity and relevance of information science is 
increasingly being challenged by developments in such diverse disciplines as philosophy of 
information, computer science, informatics, artificial intelligence and cognitive science. It is 
our contention that information science is set apart from all of the aforementioned disciplines 
and others, and that it is therefore very much 'real'. 
 
We may best understand information science as a field of study, with human recorded 
information as its concern, focusing on the components of the information chain, studied 
through the perspective of domain analysis, in specific or general contexts. Its particular focus 
of interest is those aspects of information organisation, and of human information-related 
behaviour, which are invariant to changes in technology.  It also has a role as a science of 
evaluation of information understood as semantic content with respect to qualitative growth of 
knowledge, and change in knowledge structures in domains. 
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